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Abstract
How Uber affects public transit ridership is a relevant policy question
facing cities worldwide. Theoretically, Uber’s effect on transit is ambiguous:
while Uber is an alternative mode of travel, it can also increase the reach and
flexibility of public transit’s fixed-route, fixed-schedule service. We estimate
the effect of Uber on public transit ridership using a difference-in-differences
design that exploits variation across U.S. metropolitan areas in both the in-
tensity of Uber penetration and the timing of Uber entry. We find that Uber
is a complement for the average transit agency, increasing ridership by five
percent after two years. This average effect masks considerable heterogeneity,
with Uber increasing ridership more in larger cities and for smaller transit
agencies.
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1 Introduction
Uber, Lyft, and other ride-hailing companies have transformed the transportation
marketplace in over six hundred cities around the world. While their entry into
cities has been controversial, they have been credited with providing a reliable and
affordable transportation option, serving neglected areas of cities, and providing
meaningful employment. Against these benefits, they have been accused of being
unsafe, creating congestion, destroying stable jobs, and flouting the law. Govern-
ments have struggled to decide how to regulate these companies, in part because
of a poor understanding of the actual economic effects of ride-hailing companies.
Economists are quickly trying to understand Uber’s general economic effects
and especially its influence on other modes of transportation. Uber’s direct benefits
appear to be large. Using Uber’s individual-level data and its unique use of surge
pricing, Cohen et al. (2016) estimate that UberX created $6.8 billion of consumer
surplus in 2015. The indirect effects are less clear: recent evidence shows that
Uber could benefit public health by reducing drunk driving accidents and fatalities
(Greenwood and Wattal 2017; Peck 2017; Dills and Mulholland 2018), though other
research finds no effect on traffic fatalities (Brazil and Kirk 2016). In terms of the
effect on other modes of transportation, Nie (2017) finds Uber has reduced taxi
ridership, though its effect on taxi driver wages is less clear (Cramer 2016; Berger
et al. 2018).
This paper’s contribution is to measure the effect of Uber on public transit.
There are three reasons Uber’s effect on public transit is important, and all three
depend on whether Uber complements public transit. First, Uber could have
important effects on public transit’s social efficiency. Transit fares are typically
above social marginal cost (though below average cost) due to economies of scale
and density, implying transit ridership is inefficiently low.1 If Uber increases
transit ridership this would then increase the efficiency of the public-transit system.
Second, Uber’s effect on public transit directly affects city and state budgets. Ride-
hailing services already face fierce political opposition from taxi services, and its
effect on government budgets could tip the political balance.2 Third, the interaction
1Proost and Dender (2008), Parry and Small (2009), and Basso and Silva (2014) show that
increasing transit subsidies, and so increasing transit ridership, increases social welfare given the
existing set of transportation policies.
2See Spicer and Eidelman (2017) for a review of the political opposition to Uber.
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between Uber and public transit affects congestion and pollution.3 Regardless of
whether Uber is a complement or substitute for public transit, Uber can increase
congestion and pollution simply by increasing the number of trips taken. However,
its effect on congestion and pollution will be larger if it is a net substitute for
transit.
Uber could affect public transit through two mechanisms. On the one hand,
Uber is an alternative mode of travel, and riders might leave public transit for the
new mode. On the other hand, riders could use Uber to overcome the last mile
problem caused by public transit’s fixed-route, fixed-schedule service. Support
for both mechanisms can be found from trends in public transit use. In favor of
substitution, ridership has declined for many public transit providers in the U.S.,
and pundits have speculated Uber could be the cause.4 In favor of Uber’s role as
complement, when the London Underground extended its service hours, Uber
ridership during those hours increased.5
Uber data and surveys on ride-hailing use show clear correlations between Uber
and public transit use, but such data have not concluded what the causal effect of
Uber is on public transit. First, in several cities, 25-40 percent of all Uber pick-ups
and drop-offs are near a public transit station; however, Uber acknowledges that it
is impossible to tell whether someone is using Uber to get to a transit stop or to
get to a destination that happens to be near a transit stop (Smith 2015). Second,
a Pew (2016) survey found that public transit use is highly correlated with Uber
use, with 9 percent of those who do not use Uber at all taking public transit each
week and 56 percent of those who use Uber weekly taking public transit each
week. Third, Murphy and Feigon (2016) found that 15 percent of those who use
ride-hailing apps, car-sharing, or bike-sharing report that they ride public transit
3See Anderson (2014) and Adler and van Ommeren (2016) for evidence that public transit
reduces congestion, and Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018) for evidence that public transit reduces air
pollution.
4For example, see Fitzsimmons, Emma. 2017. “Subway Ridership Declines in New York. Is
Uber to Blame?" New York Times. 24 February 2017; Nelson, Laura and Dan Weikel. 2016. “Billions
spent, but fewer people are using public transportation in Southern California.” Los Angeles Times.
27 January 2016; Curry, Bill. 2016. “Where have all the transit riders gone.” The Globe and Mail. 27
May 2016; or Lazo, Luz. 2016. “Ripple effect of Metro’s troubles: plummeting bus ridership across
the region.” The Washington Post. 20 February 2016.
5“London’s new late night alternative: The Night Tube + Uber.” 7 Octo-
ber 2016. Accessed 9 October 2017. https://medium.com/uber-under-the-hood/
londons-new-late-night-alternative-the-night-tube-uber-8f38e56de983.
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more but Rayle et al. (2016) found that 33 percent of those using a ride-hailing app
in San Francisco said their next best alternative for their current trip was using
public transit. Thus, while the evidence suggests there is a relationship, nothing
has provided a clear picture of the net effect.
We estimate Uber’s net effect on public transit using a difference-in-differences
approach across all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States
with public transit. We exploit two sources of variation across MSAs. The first is
variation in when Uber entered each market, and the second is variation in the
intensity of Uber penetration, as measured using the relative number of Google
searches for “Uber” in each MSA. This measure is strongly correlated with the
number of Uber drivers per capita in each market (Cramer 2016).
A major threat to identification is whether Uber chooses to enter based on
something correlated with transit ridership. We address this concern in four ways.
First, we discussed this issue with executives at Uber and they stated that the
formal process for deciding where to enter did not include a discussion of public
transit. Second, confirming their statement, regression analysis shows Uber largely
entered MSAs in population rank order. Third, our main regressions allow each
MSA to have its own linear time trend, and fourth, a test similar to Autor (2003)
shows there are no pre-trends in transit ridership related to when Uber enters a
MSA.
Using public transit data from the National Transit Database, we find that for
the typical transit agency Uber complements public transit, with a one standard
deviation increase in Uber penetration leading to a 1.38% increase in transit
ridership. Uber’s effect on transit ridership grows slowly over time, increasing
transit ridership by 5% after two years. However, this average effect masks
considerable heterogeneity in Uber’s effect on public transit. Uber is more of a
complement in larger cities and for transit agencies with lower ridership prior to
Uber’s existence, and Uber penetration is higher in the same places. Comparing
the effect across modes, Uber’s effect on bus ridership follows the same pattern of
increasing average ridership, having a larger effect on larger cities and for smaller
bus agencies; in contrast, Uber is more of a complement for larger rail agencies.
We also find suggestive evidence that Uber is reducing commute times for those
riding public transit, while increasing traffic congestion.
This paper is a continuation of the the literature on how new transportation
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technologies affect cities. For example, LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) show how the
invention of the automobile changed where rich and poor live within cities, and
Baum-Snow (2007) shows how the construction of limited access highways lead
to suburbanization. This paper provides the first estimates of how ride-hailing is
affecting cities, via its effect on public transportation.
Our results also speak to the literature on factors affecting transit use. Baum-
Snow and Kahn (2000) show that public investments in transit leads to more
transit ridership; our findings are consistent with theirs but we show that increased
ridership can come from private investment. Uber, however, does reduce transit
ridership in some cities, consistent with Goetzke (2008), who find that transit usage
is decreasing in car access.
2 Why Uber could be either a complement or substi-
tute for public transit
Our goal is to measure the net impact of Uber on public transit, to establish
whether it is a net substitute or a net complement for public transit.
It is easy to make a case that Uber could take riders away from public transit:
Uber increases the convenience and reduces the cost of taking a taxi-like service.
Greenwood and Wattal (2017) show that UberX provides a 20 to 30 percent re-
duction in prices relative to traditional taxis. Uber is also typically more convenient
as a ride can be hailed easily through a smartphone application and provides
real-time information on the estimated arrival time. While Uber fares are typically
higher than public transit fares, riders will substitute Uber for public transit if
Uber is fast enough and convenient enough to outweigh its additional cost.
The case for Uber complementing public transit comes from the fact that most
public transit systems use fixed routes with fixed schedules. It is Uber’s ability
to fill in the holes in public transit coverage, substituting for particularly bad
transit trips, that allows Uber to complement transit overall. There are at least two
mechanisms by which this can happen.
First, Uber makes it cheaper and easier to travel to places, and at times, that
public transit serves poorly. As a result, the combination of public transit and
Uber can make it possible to complete all desired trips without owning a car, or
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for families to own just one car. In addition, the first and last portions of a trip
on public transit typically account for a small share of the distance traveled but a
large share of the travel time; by substituting for this portion of a trip, Uber can
lower the cost of using transit for the main portion of the trip. This can especially
make traveling by train more appealing. As another example, people might take
transit to an evening activity and then, because transit service is less frequent late
at night, take Uber home.
Second, Uber helps deal with the risks of relying on fixed-schedule public
transit. Some people might be happy to use public transit if it provided the same
flexibility as driving but choose not to do so because the schedule cannot respond
to personal emergencies or changes in work schedules. The ability to use Uber if
you need to get home because a child is sick or do not want to wait for the bus
in the rain could make riding public transit more appealing, increasing transit
ridership.
It is also possible that Uber does not affect individuals’ transit use. Tautologi-
cally, Uber will not affect public transit if none of its riders used public transit. It
may be the case that public transit riders, knowing they need to rely on public
transit, have already chosen work, shopping, and living arrangements subject to
their transit constraints. If Uber does not provide a greater benefit than public
transit, or if Uber’s benefit does not justify the cost, then we will not observe a
change. Even if Uber does provide a benefit, research has shown that commuters
do not experiment with travel patterns and overlook more efficient routes unless
forced to try them (Larcom et al. 2017).
At the individual level, there is evidence for all of the above effects. The goal of
this paper is to determine the net effect, and as the strength of these mechanisms
differs for different types of trips, we expect to find that Uber has heterogeneous
effects on transit. In particular, Uber is likely to have a stronger effect, either
positive or negative, in larger cities where transit riders tend to be wealthier and
thus able to pay Uber fares.6 In addition, smaller transit agencies will tend to have
less complete coverage in terms of both geographic coverage and frequency. This
could mean that their service is so poor that Uber will be a strong substitute, or
6In smaller cities a greater share of transit riders are those who cannot afford to drive. These
“captive riders” are unlikely to switch to Uber. We find that the correlation between the median
income of transit riders and MSA population is 0.234 in the 2011–2015 American Community
Survey 5-year estimates.
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that Uber’s ability to fill holes in their coverage is all the more valuable so that
Uber will be a strong complement.
3 Data
To estimate the effect of Uber on public transit, we collect data on transit ridership,
Uber entry and exit, and a variety of controls for 2004–2015. Our unit of observation
is a transit agency, and the average Metropolitan Statistical Area with public transit
contains 2.21 transit agencies.
Our data on transit ridership come from the National Transit Database (NTD).
This database contains monthly ridership for essentially all transit agencies which
receive federal funding and reports ridership separately by mode (bus, train, etc.).7
Specifically, they report the number of times a rider steps onto a transit vehicle,
and so a trip that uses multiple transit vehicles counts as multiple rides. In 2015,
the National Transit Database captured 98% of the total number of trips that
the American Public Transit Association estimates happened in the country and
over 99% of those trips that happened on a bus or train (2018).8 The National
Transit Database also contains data on important supply-side variables: fares,
capital expenditures, maximum number of vehicles in service, the number of
vehicle-hours of service, and the number of vehicle-miles of service.
We gathered information for each MSA on when each Uber service entered,
and exited.9 Our sample includes 196 MSAs where Uber has had a presence. Entry
and exit were determined based on newspaper articles as well as Uber’s press
releases, blog posts, and social media posts.
We proxy for Uber penetration rates using data from Google Trends on the
share of Google searches for “Uber” at the MSA level, an approach similar to
7Any agency receiving funds from a Federal Transit Administration (FTA) formula program
must submit reports to the NTD. Such programs account for seventy percent of all FTA funding. To
the best of our knowledge, the only other source of federal funding for public transit is Department
of Homeland Security funding for security improvements. Transit systems with no trains and no
more than 30 vehicles in operation at any time are not required to report monthly ridership.
8Breaking this down by mode, the gap is largest for demand response (typically transit for the
disabled) (25%) and ferries (15%), while for commuter rail and buses, the gap is less than 1%, and
for subways, light rail, and streetcars the NTD captures all trips.
9We use the 2009 definitions of MSAs throughout this paper.
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Cramer (2016).10 Because Google Trends normalizes their data so the largest
observation in any dataset is 100, and because it is only possible to download data
for a few MSAs at a time, each time we download data we include San Francisco.
We then normalize each downloaded data set by the search index in San Francisco
the week starting January 29th, 2017, and multiply by 100. For our regressions we
then convert our measure of search intensity into standard deviation units.
In order to validate our Uber penetration measure, we were able to obtain
data from Uber for 16 MSAs similar to that used by Hall and Krueger (2018). We
find that Google searches for “Uber” are strongly correlated with the number of
active drivers per capita in each market; with an estimated correlation coefficient
(when measured in logs) of 0.948.11 To address the concern that this correlation is
spurious due to a common time trend, we calculate the correlation between the
change in the log the number of active drivers per capita and change in the log in
the Google Trends search index; we find this correlation is 0.292. Figure 1 plots the
number of drivers per 10,000 residents and the Google Trends search index for the
16 cities we have both sets of data for, showing visually how strongly these are
correlated. Google Trends data was available for 147 of the 196 MSAs Uber entered
during our sample. For this reason, the sample size for some of our analysis on
Uber penetration is smaller than the sample based on entry.
We also replicate our results using the number of active Uber drivers per capita,
measured in standard deviation units, in Table A.1. Due to the small sample size,
these results are not always statistically significant, however, the point estimates
are similar to what we find using the Google Trends data, as well as with the
Google Trends data limited to the 16 cities for which we have data on the number
of active drivers.
We also use data from a variety of sources as additional controls. In regressions
predicting Uber’s entry decision we use data on MSA population, income, age,
and education from the 2008–2012 American Community Survey 5-year estimates.
In our main regressions estimating the effect of Uber we use data on monthly MSA
total employment and unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
annual MSA population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, and monthly
10Other papers to use Google Trends data include Stephens-Davidowitz (2014), who use it to
proxy for racial animus and Hoopes et al. (2015), who use it to measure searches for information
about taxes.
11A driver is active if they complete at least four trips in a given month.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Median Std. dev.
Panel A: Transit agency summary statistics
Average bus fare 1.31 0.75 4.45
Average rail fare 4.94 2.00 11.0
Average fare 1.77 0.91 4.13
Maximum bus vehicles operating 108.1 30 283.8
Maximum rail vehicles operating 274.5 51 725.3
Maximum vehicles operating 185.2 48 590.1
Bus vehicle revenue hours (1,000) 27.8 6.90 79.1
Rail vehicle revenue hours (1,000) 76.5 11.9 231.2
Vehicle revenue hours (1,000) 40.4 8.70 158.9
Bus vehicle revenue miles (1,000) 345.6 100.4 813.7
Rail vehicle revenue miles (1,000) 1672.0 231.1 4556.6
Vehicle revenue miles (1,000) 616.5 135.2 2326.7
Bus ridership (100,000) 9.53 1.32 41.3
Rail ridership (100,000) 63.5 7.90 263.8
Total ridership (100,000) 15.6 1.21 124.7
Observations 76,213
Panel B: MSA summary statistics
Population (100,000) 8.74 3.45 17.9
Employment (100,000) 4.12 1.57 8.39
Gas price 2.94 2.91 0.65
Google search intensity for “Uber” 2.08 0.75 3.79
Uber in MSA 0.075 0 0.26
Observations 40,012
Notes: The summary statistics in Panel A are averages of monthly observations from 2004–2015 for
all transit agencies in the NTD. Those in Panel B are averages of monthly observations for each
MSA. See text for Panel B’s data sources. Transit ridership measures the number of times someone
steps onto a transit vehicle, and so a trip that uses multiple transit vehicles counts as multiple rides.
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Figure 2: National transit ridership over time: 1991–2015
Notes: National transit ridership measured from the National Transit Database. Transit ridership
measures the number of times someone steps onto a transit vehicle, and so a trip that uses multiple
transit vehicles counts as multiple rides.
regional gas prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our sample, and Figure 2 plots the
national trends in transit ridership from 1991–2015. Note that Figure 2 clearly
shows the effects of the 2007–2009 recession, as well as a recent decline which has
led to speculation on whether Uber has decreased transit ridership. The left side
of Figure 3 plots the relationship between population and total transit ridership for
each MSA, and shows that larger cities have more transit ridership than smaller
cities, and that transit ridership climbs faster than population, with a 10% increase
in population leading to a 15.5% increase in total ridership. The right side of
Figure 3 plots the relationship between MSA population and transit ridership for
individual transit agencies, showing that within an MSA there is large variation in
the size of transit agencies.
4 Method
We estimate the effect of Uber on public transit ridership using a difference-in-
differences approach. We compare how transit ridership changes in cities when
Uber enters relative to changes in cities where Uber has not entered yet. While
Uber offers several services, including a black car service, we focus on the entry of
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UberX, which accounts for the vast majority of their ridership.
Our estimates are based on the following regression:
Yi,t = βDc(i),t + γi + δt + θi,m(t) + ζc(i) · t+ X ′i,tη+ ei,t.
where Yit is log transit ridership on transit agency i in year-month t; Dc(i)t is 1 if
UberX is active in the MSA c(i) in year-month t and 0 otherwise; γi is a transit
agency specific fixed effect; δt is a year-month specific fixed effect; θi,m(t) is a transit
agency-calendar month fixed effect included to address seasonality in transit
ridership;12 ζc(i) is an MSA specific time trend; and x′it is a vector of controls for
transit agency i, such as MSA population and total employment, measures of the
quantity of service the transit agency provides, and average fares, in year-month
t. These controls are all factors which affect transit ridership, however, it is also
possible that they are changing endogenously in response to Uber’s entry. If this
were the case, including them biases our estimates.13 To address this concern, in
Panel B of Table A.2 we show our results are robust to leaving out these controls.
To address the serial correlation in the outcomes, we follow the recommendation
of Bertrand et al. (2004) to cluster the standard errors, and do so at the MSA level.
We also estimate a version of this same empirical model based on the level of
penetration of Uber. We use the same empirical framework as before, but now
Dc(i)t is the standardized Google Trends search index in MSA c(i). This second
measure allows us to exploit variation within the set of treated cities in their
intensity of treatment. This captures Uber’s market penetration across all their
services.
Choosing between the Uber entry-dates and the Google Trends treatments is a
trade-off between interpretation and precision. The Uber entry-dates have a clear
interpretation: accounting for each city’s history and national trends, Uber’s entry
changed transit ridership by β. But the gain in clarity sacrifices precision because
it treats Uber’s entry to New York, NY the same as it does Pocatello, ID. The
Google Trends data creates better precision because it allows treatment intensity
12We omit the transit agency-calendar month fixed effect for January to avoid perfect collinearity
between the transit agency-calendar month fixed effects and the transit agency fixed effect.
13For example, if transit agencies respond to Uber by reducing transit service, which then reduces
transit ridership, then controlling for the amount of transit service will cause our estimates to miss
out on this causal channel by which Uber affects transit ridership.
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to vary across cities but the interpretation is murkier because the frequency of
searches for “Uber” is an equilibrium outcome rather than a measure of exogenous
differences in supply. While neither treatment measure is perfect, together they
provide insight into the effect of Uber on public transit.
Because we are using difference-in-differences with MSA-specific time trends,
the key identifying assumption is that of parallel growth in treated and untreated
cities. Thus we are assuming that transit ridership for agencies in San Francisco
would have grown above trend by the same percentage as agencies in New York
City, except for the presence of Uber (and conditional on controls). Fundamental
differences between cities that only effect the level or growth rate of their agencies’
transit ridership, such as the built environment or weather, are adjusted for by the
fixed effects and time trends. Threats to identification instead come from factors
that vary over time at the MSA or transit agency level, covered in the next section.
5 Estimating Uber’s entry decision
The greatest threat to identification comes from whether Uber chooses to enter
based on something that is correlated with transit ridership. Uber executives told
us that the official expansion process did not consider public transportation, nor
were they in any meetings that discussed public transportation when deciding
where to enter. They reported that Uber’s goal was to cover as much of the nation
(and world) as soon as possible. While this does not mean Uber’s entry decision is
not driven by a third factor which is itself correlated with transit ridership, it is
reassuring. To more fully address this issue, we estimate how Uber decides when
and where to enter, concluding Uber largely entered markets based on population,
working from large to small.
Figure 4 shows when Uber first entered each MSA, and Figure 5 shows Uber
was introduced to cities essentially in population rank order. Kendall’s rank
correlation between population and entry date is −.37 and for any two MSAs
Uber has entered, the probability Uber was available in the larger MSA first is 68
percent.
The first column in Table 2 reports the results of a linear regression predicting
when Uber enters an MSA. The independent variables are measured in standard
deviation units to facilitate comparison of the magnitudes of the coefficients. We
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find that population is the strongest predictor of when Uber enters an MSA, with
an effect double that of any other predictor. We also find that the levels matter more
than trends, meaning Uber cares more about being in large cities rather than in
growing cities, and rich cities more than cities getting richer. These results increase
our confidence that Uber enters markets largely in order of their population rank.
Population and education levels are also the best predictor of whether Uber
enters an MSA. The second column of Table 2 reports the result from a linear
regression predicting whether Uber has entered an MSA. Once again, population
is the strongest predictor of whether Uber enters an MSA: the coefficient on
population is more than 60 percent larger than the next largest. The three largest
MSAs without Uber are all in New York, as Uber was banned in upstate New
York prior to June of 2017.14 Kendall’s rank correlation between population and
whether Uber has ever entered is .49.
These results suggest that Uber has focused on entering larger cities first, and
gives us confidence that their entry decision is uncorrelated with other trends in
public transit ridership.
6 Estimating Uber’s effect on transit
We start with a visual summary of the transit ridership data in Figure 6. This
figure plots the difference in log transit ridership for transit agencies who had Uber
in their MSA relative to those who did not, using a 24 month-window before and
after Uber’s entry. The difference in log transit ridership the month before Uber
enters is normalized to zero. Figure 6 shows no significant pre-trend, suggesting
that, given our set of controls and MSA-specific-linear-time-trends, the parallel
trends assumption holds.
Additionally, Figure 6 shows that transit ridership increases slowly after Uber
enters an MSA, until two years after Uber’s entry transit ridership is 5–8 percent
higher than it would have otherwise been. While only one of the month-specific
estimates is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, we can reject the joint
hypothesis that all of the month-specific estimates after Uber’s entry are zero.
Table 3 reports our estimates for the effect of Uber on overall transit ridership.
14Nir, Sarah Maslin and James Barron. 2017. “Relief and Trepidation as Ride Hailing Spreads
Across New York.” The New York Times. 3 July 2017.
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Table 2: Linear regressions predicting when and whether Uber enters an MSA
Date UberX entry Did UberX enter
(1) (2)
Log(population) (σ) -103.2∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(4.690) (0.00705)
Percent with bachelor’s degree (σ) -41.77∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(5.108) (0.00857)
Median age (σ) 30.90∗∗∗ -0.0518∗∗∗
(5.777) (0.00844)
Median income (σ) -11.40∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗
(4.905) (0.00963)
Excess unemployment (σ) -41.73∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗
(4.713) (0.00789)
Percent work trips transit (σ) -9.956∗∗ -0.0792∗∗∗
(4.968) (0.00948)
Capital expenditures on public transit (σ) -4.868 -0.00152
(4.939) (0.00698)
Dist from Uber HQ (σ) 11.99∗∗∗ 0.00823
(4.389) (0.00662)
Trend in log(population) (σ) 11.46 0.0214∗
(8.225) (0.0120)
Trend in median income (σ) 1.641 -0.0298
(13.65) (0.0204)
Observations 197 386
Adjusted R-squared 0.383 0.394
Notes: Data on when Uber entered each MSA collected by the authors. Data on population,
income, age, and education from the 2008–2012 American Community Survey 5-year estimates.
Excess unemployment is the difference between the unemployment rate in 2012 and the mean
unemployment rate between 2004–2015, and this data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Capital
expenditures on public transit is the total per capita between 2008–2012. Capital expenditure data is
from the National Transit Database. Linear trends in population and median income are estimated
using the American Community Survey 1-year estimates from 2008–2012. All independent variables
are measured in standard deviation units. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with
one thousand draws and are in parentheses. The bootstrap procedure includes the estimation of
the linear trends.
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
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Figure 6: Effect of Uber on log transit ridership before and after entry
Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from a Autor (2003)-style regression of log transit ridership
on leads and lags of Uber entry, as well as the controls and fixed effects in our base specification.
The omitted indicator is the month before Uber enters. Bars denote 95 percent confidence intervals.
Our outcome variables are all measured in logs so the coefficients represent the
percent increase in public transit ridership that accompanies the arrival or increased
penetration of Uber. Column 1 confirms what Figure 6 shows, that when Uber
arrives in an MSA, transit ridership does not change much, with a coefficient
that indicates there is a 0.26 percent increase in public transit use which is not
statistically significant. However, the results in Column 5 indicate that as Uber
becomes more commonly used in the MSA, there is an increase in public transit
use, with a standard deviation increase in Uber penetration increasing public
transit ridership by 1.4 percent. This is consistent with the slowly growing effect
of Uber on transit ridership shown in Figure 6.
One reason Uber is a complement rather than a substitute for the average transit
agency may be that transit is still much cheaper to use. The median minimum
Uber fare is $5, while transit fares average just $1. Undiscounted fares for bus or
light rail are never above $3, and for those with a monthly pass the marginal fare
is zero. Transit is cheaper by enough that Uber’s role in adding flexibility to the
transit system is more important than its ability to substitute for riding transit.
This average treatment effect masks considerable heterogeneity in the effect
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Table 3: Effect of Uber on log transit ridership
Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UberX 0.00263 -0.0591∗∗ 0.0598∗∗ -0.00190 0.0138∗∗∗ -0.00483 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.00758
(0.0143) (0.0295) (0.0236) (0.0364) (0.00515) (0.00526) (0.00652) (0.00677)
Above median population 0.0666∗∗ 0.0665∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗
× UberX (0.0294) (0.0307) (0.00716) (0.00796)
Above median ridership -0.0811∗∗∗ -0.0811∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗
× UberX (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.00977) (0.0100)
Observations 71,386 71,386 71,386 71,386 58,015 58,015 58,015 58,015
Clusters 309 309 309 309 227 227 227 227
Notes: Controls are the log of the following: average fare, the maximum number of vehicles in
service during the month, vehicle-hours of service, vehicle-miles of service, regional gas prices,
employment, and population. Includes a linear MSA time-trend and fixed effects for each month-
year, transit agency, and transit agency-calendar month pair. Median population is calculated
among the set of MSAs with public transportation. Median ridership is calculated based on mean
ridership before Uber existed. Uber penetration is measured using Google Trends and reported in
standard deviation units. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the MSA
level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
of Uber on transit. We expand our analysis to examine how the effect of Uber
differs based on the population of the MSA and the number of riders that were
using public transit before Uber arrived. For both of these measures, we split the
sample based on whether an observation is above or below our sample median
and include each of these binary variables as an interaction term with our Uber
measures. The median population is 280,000 and median monthly ridership is
82,000. Table 4 reports example of transit agencies with each possible combination
of our dummy variables for ridership and population. The big transit agencies
in small cities are almost always in university towns, while small agencies in big
cities are a mix of suburban agencies and cities with limited public transit.
Our results indicate that Uber reduces transit ridership in smaller MSAs while
increasing ridership in larger cities. In fact, the coefficients in Table 3 indicate
that the arrival of Uber in smaller cities decreases public transit ridership by 5.9
percent while increasing public transit ridership by 0.8 percent for agencies in the
larger cities. Our estimates based on the Uber penetration rates indicate that a
standard deviation increase in Uber use lowers public transit ridership for agencies
in smaller cities by 0.5 percent while increasing ridership in larger cities by 1.8
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Table 4: Examples of transit agencies by ridership and MSA size
Small Big
County of Lebanon Transit  (PA) McAllen Express Transit (TX)
Springfield City Area Transit (OH) MTA (Manchester, NH)
Mid-Ohio Valley Transit  (Parkersburg, WV) East Chicago Transit (IL)
CyRide (Ames, IA) MTA (New York, NY)
Tompkins Consolidated Area Transit (Ithaca, NY) MTA (Nashville, TN)
Cache Valley Transit District (Logan, UT) Green Bay Metro (WI)
Population
Sm
al
l
Bi
gR
id
er
sh
ip
Notes: Big and small are defined relative to the median.
percent.
In contrast, we find that Uber actually had the largest effects for transit agencies
that had smaller levels of initial ridership prior to Uber’s founding. For the
transit agencies that had below median public transit ridership, the arrival of
Uber increased public transit use by 6 percent while for the transit agencies with
above median ridership, it decreased public transit use by 2.1 percent. All of these
estimates are roughly the same whether or not we simultaneously control for
population and pre-Uber public transit ridership.
Uber most strongly complements small transit agencies in large cities. This
is likely because a small transit agency in a large city provides the least flexible
service in terms of when and where they travel, and so Uber’s ability to add
flexibility for such agencies is valuable to riders.15 In addition, transit riders in
larger cities tend to be wealthier, and so there is greater overlap between those
who ride transit and can afford to take Uber.16
Such heterogeneous effects across cities and agencies suggest exploring their
15Consistent with this interpretation, in 2016 and 2017 some cities partnered with Uber to
supplement or replace weaker public transit services. Three cities ran such programs: Tampa, FL;
Dublin, CA; and Philadelphia, PA. All such partnerships began after our data end and should
not affect our results. In results not reported in this paper, dropping these three MSAs from our
sample did not alter the results. See Zwick and Spicer (2018) for a more detailed discussion of why
and how cities partner with Uber.
16While our data do not allow us to observe characteristics of people who use Uber or public
transit, the Pew Study reveals some important demographic information. Compared to Americans
who had never used Uber, Americans who had used Uber by 2016 were significantly more likely to
earn more than $75,000 a year and to have graduated college. In the same study, there were no
meaningful differences in income or education between Uber users who do and do not use public
transit.
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correlation with Uber uptake. In Table 5 we estimate how Uber entry affects Uber
penetration, using Google Trends as a proxy.17 Because Google Trends does not
vary across agencies within an MSA, we run the regressions at the MSA level.
Changing the level of observation does not affect the population variable, but
it does force us to redefine our “above median ridership” variable. We use two
alternatives to denote MSAs with smaller transit agencies: (1) whether the MSA
has at least one below median ridership agency, (2) the number of transit agencies.
Unsurprisingly, Uber entry significantly increases Google searches for Uber. When
we allow the effect to differ by population and transit agency characteristics, we
find Uber’s penetration is highest in large cities as well as in MSAs with at least
one small transit agency. Uber penetration also increases with the number of
transit agencies servicing the MSA. Because Uber penetration is higher in the same
places where Uber is complementing transit, the evidence supports the hypothesis
that Uber is a net complement to transit.
Table 6 reports the result of estimating the effect of Uber on bus ridership and
train ridership. It shows that the results for bus ridership are similar to those for
total ridership. The point estimates are of the same sign, though we have fewer
observations and thus less power, so they are typically less statistically significant.
However, Uber’s effect on rail ridership is different from its effect on bus and
overall ridership. In particular, Uber now helps larger agencies relative to smaller
agencies.
The results by mode of transportation also highlight some of the potential ways
in which the effects of Uber may have spillover effects for transit agencies in the
same MSA. For example, combining the main effect of Uber penetration with the
interaction effect for being in a large city indicates that in large cities with low
public transit use to begin with, a standard deviation increase in Uber penetration
results in a 2.96% increase in bus ridership but a 0.76% decrease in train ridership.
Thus while the overall effect of Uber on total public transit use is positive in these
cities, there is potentially some shifting of train ridership towards bus ridership.
These estimates weight all transit agencies identically, and thus are estimates of
how Uber affects the typical transit agency. To instead estimate how Uber effects
national transit ridership, in Panel A of Table A.2 we report results where each
17In Section 3 we demonstrated that Google Trends is a suitable proxy for the number of Uber
drivers per capita, and thus a good proxy for Uber’s market penetration.
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Table 5: Effect of Uber entry on Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UberX 0.470∗∗∗ 0.111 0.266∗∗∗ -0.0749 0.252∗∗∗ 0.0135
(0.0543) (0.125) (0.0767) (0.141) (0.0840) (0.128)
Above median population 0.418∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗
× UberX (0.139) (0.138) (0.141)
Has below median agency 0.499∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
× UberX (0.133) (0.130)
Number of transit agencies 0.0681∗∗ 0.0642∗∗
× UberX (0.0288) (0.0281)
Observations 29,854 29,854 29,854 29,854 29,854 29,854
Clusters 229 229 229 229 229 229
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the Google Trends measure of searches for
Uber in the MSA, measured in standard deviation units. Controls are the log of regional gas prices,
employment, and population. Regressions include a linear MSA time-trend and fixed effects for
each month-year, MSA, and MSA-calendar month pair. Median population is calculated among the
set of MSAs with public transportation. Median ridership is calculated based on mean ridership
before Uber existed. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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Table 6: Effect of Uber on log bus ridership and log rail ridership
Bus Rail
Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UberX 0.0189 0.0168 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.00243 -0.0312 -0.103∗ 0.00370 -0.0274
(0.0166) (0.0327) (0.00456) (0.00592) (0.0194) (0.0533) (0.0179) (0.0245)
Above median population 0.0383 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0365 0.0198
× UberX (0.0302) (0.00891) (0.0583) (0.0207)
Above median ridership -0.0465∗∗ -0.0131 0.0771∗∗ 0.0215
× UberX (0.0221) (0.00845) (0.0363) (0.0152)
Observations 53,295 53,295 42,673 42,673 7,427 7,427 7,360 7,360
Clusters 294 294 216 216 45 45 43 43
Notes: Controls are the log of the following: average fare, the maximum number of vehicles in
service during the month, vehicle-hours of service, vehicle-miles of service, regional gas prices,
employment, and population. Includes a linear MSA time-trend and fixed effects for each month-
year, transit agency, and transit agency-calendar month pair. Median population is calculated
among the set of MSAs with the given mode of public transportation. Median ridership calculated
based on mean ridership before Uber existed and among the set of agencies with the given mode of
public transportation. Uber penetration measured using Google Trends and reported in standard
deviation units. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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transit agency is weighted by their average ridership prior to Uber’s existence.
Consistent with the finding that Uber hurts larger transit agencies and helps
smaller agencies, we estimate very small and statistically insignificant effects of
Uber on ridership. The heterogeneous effects estimated above remain.
In the appendix we conduct eight robustness tests. First, Figure A.1 plots the
event study of how transit ridership changes when Uber enters a city, and gives
similar results to Figure 6, though with larger standard errors. As mentioned
earlier, in Table A.1 we show that using the number of active Uber drivers per
capita gives similar results to using the Google Trends search index (both when
compared to our entire sample, and when compared to the 16 cities for which we
have data on the number of active drivers). Table A.2 shows our results are robust
to a number of alternate specifications. Panel B shows that our results are robust
to using population density, rather than population, as an interaction variable for
Uber’s effect on public transit ridership. Panel C shows our results are robust to
leaving out New York City and in Panel D we address the concern that the controls
are endogenous by showing our results are robust to leaving out the controls.
Next, while we clustered our standard errors at the MSA level to address the serial
correlation in the outcomes, Table A.3 shows our results are robust to alternative
corrections to this problem. First, in Panel A, we calculate standard errors by
block bootstrapping, and, second, in Panels B and C, we conduct placebo tests
where we randomly assign treatment status and treatment date. We conduct this
placebo test under two different assumptions about the data generating process.
In the first we randomly re-assign the observed treatment variables at the MSA-
month level, while in the second we randomly assign which cities Uber enters and
when. For this second test using the penetration data, we assign treated cities a
penetration history from an MSA which was actually treated and adjust the timing
to match the placebo treatment date. For untreated cities, we randomly assign
a penetration history from an MSA which was not treated. We then calculate
p-values by comparing the t-statistic from our main results to those generated by
two thousand placebo treatments.
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6.1 Estimating Uber’s effect on commute times
Because the above results show that Uber changes how people travel, it also could
affect commute times. However, it is hard to predict how Uber should affect them.
For those who use Uber for the first or last mile of a trip, commute times will
fall. For those who begin taking public transit because Uber has lowered the total
cost by making transit more convenient or reliable, the change in commute times
is indeterminate since commuters might be willing to accept longer commute
times for the lower total cost.18 Even if commute times fall for all Uber users, the
effect on average commute times depends on whether Uber significantly increases
congestion, which would increase commute times for other commuters.
We estimate how Uber affects average commute times using the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) data for each MSA. In Table 7, using the same identification
strategy as our main results, we find that Uber’s entry increases commute times in
larger cities with small transit agencies, the same MSAs where we see transit usage
increase. We also find that as Uber’s penetration increases in an MSA, commutes
get longer. The effect does not vary across MSA size or transit characteristics. The
effects are consistent with Uber leading people to switch to transit, leading to
longer commutes, but also may be indicative of Uber increasing traffic congestion.
To disentangle the effects on transit usage and congestion, we take advantage
of the ACS data on commute times by primary mode of transit. This analysis
is speculative because the data are repeated cross-sections, not panel, and Uber
affects the composition of the groups, but it is worth examining. In Tables 8 and
9 we estimate the effect of Uber on commuters using public transportation and
private vehicle. For public transportation users, the coefficients are large and
negative, but the results are not statistically significant, and commute times for
private vehicle commuters in large MSAs or those with a small transit agency
increased by 1.5-2.5 percent. Together these results suggest that Uber reduced
commute times for public transit users while increasing congestion.
18Total costs includes, in additional to travel time, financial costs and reliability.
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Table 7: Effect of Uber on log commute times
Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UberX 0.00322 -0.0164∗ -0.0125 0.00883∗∗∗ 0.00859∗ 0.0107∗∗
(0.00538) (0.00889) (0.00909) (0.00312) (0.00514) (0.00487)
Above median population 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0153∗ -0.0000711 -0.00283
× UberX (0.00804) (0.00843) (0.00380) (0.00353)
Has below median agency 0.0201∗ 0.00507
× UberX (0.0108) (0.00443)
Number of transit agencies 0.000824 0.000130
× UberX (0.000660) (0.000233)
Observations 2,672 2,672 2,672 2,018 2,018 2,018
Clusters 305 305 305 222 222 222
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the log of the average commute time reported
in the one-year American Community Survey estimates. Controls are the log of employment,
population, and regional gas prices. Regressions include a linear MSA time-trend and fixed effects
for each month-year, transit agency, and transit agency-calendar month pair. Median population is
calculated among the set of MSAs with public transportation. Median ridership calculated based
on mean ridership before Uber existed. Uber penetration measured using Google Trends and
reported in standard deviation units. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at
the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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Table 8: Effect of Uber on log public transportation commute times
Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UberX -0.0141 -0.0552 -0.0635 -0.00475 -0.0203 -0.00538
(0.0296) (0.0556) (0.0531) (0.0116) (0.0319) (0.0272)
Above median population 0.0539 0.0711 0.0139 0.00418
× UberX (0.0487) (0.0460) (0.0273) (0.0241)
Has below median agency -0.0488 0.0227
× UberX (0.0853) (0.0338)
Number of transit agencies -0.00272∗ -0.000477
× UberX (0.00148) (0.000498)
Observations 2,644 2,644 2,644 2,001 2,001 2,001
Clusters 305 305 305 222 222 222
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the log of the average commute time by public
transportation reported in the one-year American Community Survey estimates. Controls are
the log of employment, population, and regional gas prices. Regressions include a linear MSA
time-trend and fixed effects for each month-year, transit agency, and transit agency-calendar month
pair. Median population is calculated among the set of MSAs with public transportation. Median
ridership calculated based on mean ridership before Uber existed. Uber penetration measured
using Google Trends and reported in standard deviation units. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
27
Table 9: Effect of Uber on log private automobile commute times
Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UberX 0.00507 -0.0113 -0.00615 0.00687∗∗ 0.00610 0.00836
(0.00521) (0.00942) (0.00973) (0.00293) (0.00595) (0.00579)
Above median population 0.0174∗∗ 0.00988 0.000424 -0.00263
× UberX (0.00849) (0.00895) (0.00468) (0.00431)
Has below median agency 0.0246∗∗ 0.00555
× UberX (0.0114) (0.00521)
Number of transit agencies 0.000829 0.000156
× UberX (0.000538) (0.000218)
Observations 2,672 2,672 2,672 2,018 2,018 2,018
Clusters 305 305 305 222 222 222
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the log of the average commute time by
private automobile reported in the one-year American Community Survey estimates. Controls are
the log of employment, population, and regional gas prices. Regressions include a linear MSA
time-trend and fixed effects for each month-year, transit agency, and transit agency-calendar month
pair. Median population is calculated among the set of MSAs with public transportation. Median
ridership calculated based on mean ridership before Uber existed. Uber penetration measured
using Google Trends and reported in standard deviation units. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
28
7 Conclusion
Uber and other ride-hailing companies have changed how people get around in
cities worldwide. How this has impacted public transit matters both for assessing
the welfare effects of Uber and for cities deciding how to regulate Uber. However,
Uber’s effect on transit is theoretically ambiguous: while Uber is an alternative
mode of travel, it can also increase the reach and flexibility of transit’s fixed-route,
fixed-schedule service. The results in this paper employ a difference-in-differences
design that exploits variation across U.S. metropolitan areas in both the intensity of
Uber penetration and the timing of Uber entry. We find that Uber’s entry increases
public transit use for the average transit agency and that the effect grows over
time.
Exploring the heterogeneity behind the average effect, we find that Uber is
a complement to small transit agencies and to agencies in large cities. The data
are insufficient for probing the mechanism behind the heterogeneity, but there
are some clear candidates. The complementary effect for small transit agencies
suggests customers are using Uber to circumvent the fixed-route, fixed-schedule
problem. Transit users in large cities have greater variation in income, and the
complementary effects could come from the group of riders who can afford Uber.
High-income riders could also explain why Uber has a large complementary
effect on rail ridership and a negative effect on bus ridership: rail riders typically
have higher incomes, while high-income bus riders might be willing to pay for a
pricier Uber ride. The scope of this paper requires us to label such explanations
as speculative, but richer data in future research could provide a more definitive
answer.
The results from this paper provide further evidence that Uber increases welfare,
although more work needs to be done before drawing definitive conclusions.
Results from previous work indicated that Uber increases consumer surplus
(Cohen et al. 2016), but, perhaps, with some cost to taxi driver earnings (Cramer
2016; Berger et al. 2018). This paper’s results indicate that Uber has an additional
effect on social welfare through encouraging use of public transit. In fact, Uber has
the biggest complementary effects on the public transit systems that had the lowest
ridership before Uber’s entry. However, Uber seems to be decreasing ridership on
larger systems, and our estimates suggest the effect on these systems counteracts
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the increase on smaller systems. Furthermore, while increasing public transit use
would decrease congestion (Anderson 2014; Adler and van Ommeren 2016), Uber
could still have a net increase on congestion by either increasing the total trips
taken or by flooding the streets with Uber drivers looking for a fare. Exploring
Uber’s impact on urban transit and traffic warrants more attention.
The results also warn against making broad policy prescriptions regarding
Uber. Uber’s effect in a city varies based on the state of public transit. Thus the
optimal policy response may also vary across cities.
Beyond contributing to our understanding of the effect of Uber on cities, this
paper also provides preliminary insight into the economic impact of another
technological innovation within urban transportation: autonomous vehicles. While
there is much speculation about how autonomous vehicles may change cities,
no empirical estimates exist to date because the technology is so new. However,
inasmuch as the change from taxi to ride-hailing is similar to the change from
ride-hailing to autonomous vehicles, in that autonomous vehicles will make trans-
portation more convenient, accessible and affordable, then our results provide
suggestive evidence that autonomous vehicles may complement public transit, and
that this effect will likely vary across cities.
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A Robustness tests
This appendix contains several alternate specifications, as discussed in the body of
the paper, and shows that our results are robust to these other specifications. It
also contains alternate ways of testing statistical significance.
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Figure A.1: Event study of effect of Uber on log transit ridership
Notes: This figure is the same as Figure 6, except that it is limited to those MSAs where Uber ever
enters during our sample. The omitted indicator is the month before Uber enters. Bars denote 95
percent confidence intervals.
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Table A.1: Effect of the number of active Uber drivers per capita on log transit ridership
Total Bus Rail
Active drivers Uber penetration Active drivers Uber penetration Active drivers Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
UberX 0.0258 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0220 0.0554∗∗ 0.00245 0.0281 0.0133 0.0311 0.0152 -0.0144 -0.0193 -0.0294
(0.0208) (0.0227) (0.0238) (0.0248) (0.0198) (0.0213) (0.0282) (0.0298) (0.0223) (0.0329) (0.0238) (0.0202)
Above median ridership -0.0636∗∗∗ -0.0381∗∗ -0.0297∗∗ -0.0174 0.0339 0.0154
× UberX (0.0167) (0.0142) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0309) (0.0211)
Observations 19,047 19,047 19,047 19,047 13,342 13,342 13,342 13,342 4,377 4,377 4,377 4,377
Clusters 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Notes: This table estimates the effect of the number of active Uber drivers per capita on transit ridership, and compares to estimates of the
effect of our Uber penetration measure (Google Trends search intensity) on transit ridership for the same sample. The data on active drivers
per capita is only available for 16 MSAs. We impute the number of active drivers to be zero prior to any Uber service being available in the
MSA. Both treatment variables reported in standard deviation units. Above median ridership is calculated based on mean ridership before
Uber existed and among the set of agencies with the given mode of public transportation. All other controls as in Table 3. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and clustered at the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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Table A.2: Alternate specifications for the effect of Uber on log public transit ridership
Total Bus Rail
Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Weighting by pre-Uber average ridership
UberX -0.00801 0.0413 0.00374 0.0242∗ -0.0107 0.00840 0.00797 0.00576 0.00195 -0.104∗∗ -0.00912 -0.0325
(0.00743) (0.0407) (0.00844) (0.0131) (0.0113) (0.0292) (0.00833) (0.00982) (0.0125) (0.0495) (0.0139) (0.0249)
Above median population 0.0494∗∗ 0.0171∗ 0.00803 0.00936 0.0403 0.0161
× UberX (0.0225) (0.00983) (0.0276) (0.0105) (0.0379) (0.0163)
Above median ridership -0.0987∗∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0272 -0.00704 0.0682∗ 0.00782
× UberX (0.0362) (0.0132) (0.0197) (0.00715) (0.0386) (0.0161)
Observations 70,981 70,981 57,634 57,634 53,065 53,065 42,481 42,481 7,393 7,393 7,326 7,326
Clusters 308 308 227 227 293 293 216 216 44 44 42 42
Panel B: Interacting with population density
UberX -0.0375∗ 0.0179 0.00237 0.0165∗∗ -0.0221 0.00911 -0.00276 0.00209 -0.0303 -0.0614 0.00140 -0.00686
(0.0223) (0.0301) (0.00603) (0.00709) (0.0263) (0.0301) (0.00669) (0.00711) (0.0431) (0.0471) (0.0278) (0.0269)
Above median population density 0.0459∗∗ 0.0483∗∗ 0.0131∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0484∗ 0.0494∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ -0.00118 -0.0280 0.00218 -0.00503
× UberX (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.00732) (0.00760) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.00772) (0.00831) (0.0562) (0.0509) (0.0238) (0.0229)
Above median ridership -0.0817∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗∗ -0.0453∗∗ -0.0101 0.0888∗∗ 0.0253
× UberX (0.0292) (0.00988) (0.0220) (0.00768) (0.0355) (0.0152)
Observations 71,386 71,386 58,015 58,015 53,295 53,295 42,673 42,673 7,427 7,427 7,360 7,360
Clusters 309 309 227 227 294 294 216 216 45 45 43 43
Notes: Panel A reports regression results when weighting by mean ridership prior to Uber’s existence (January 2005–August 2012). Panel B
reports regression results when interacting the treatment variables with population density (rather than population). All other controls as in
Table 3. Population density estimates come from Wilson et al. (2012) and are based on the 2010 Census and weighted by population at
the census tract level to reflect the population density of the typical resident. Results are unchanged by using the unweighted population
density. All other controls as in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the MSA level.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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Table A.2: (continued)
Total Bus Rail
Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel C: Leaving out New York City
UberX -0.00272 0.00471 0.0133∗∗ 0.0107 0.0185 0.0257 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.00445 -0.0325 -0.0856∗ 0.00215 -0.0214
(0.0158) (0.0379) (0.00547) (0.00657) (0.0186) (0.0340) (0.00478) (0.00619) (0.0225) (0.0459) (0.0158) (0.0235)
Above median population 0.0613∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.0360 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0346 0.0136
× UberX (0.0306) (0.00864) (0.0307) (0.0106) (0.0463) (0.0185)
Above median ridership -0.0905∗∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0542∗∗ -0.0197∗ 0.0538 0.0198
× UberX (0.0323) (0.0105) (0.0274) (0.0103) (0.0435) (0.0173)
Observations 66,757 66,757 53,386 53,386 49,500 49,500 38,878 38,878 6,569 6,569 6,502 6,502
Clusters 308 308 226 226 293 293 215 215 44 44 42 42
Panel D: No controls
UberX 0.0212 0.0438 0.0160∗∗ 0.00792 0.0215 0.00448 0.0117∗ -0.000468 -0.0518∗ -0.120∗ 0.00779 -0.00692
(0.0189) (0.0518) (0.00655) (0.00895) (0.0211) (0.0542) (0.00595) (0.00881) (0.0273) (0.0647) (0.0185) (0.0290)
Above median population 0.0872∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.0762 0.0206
× UberX (0.0402) (0.0109) (0.0432) (0.0113) (0.0773) (0.0250)
Above median ridership -0.147∗∗∗ -0.0515∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0185 -0.00578
× UberX (0.0462) (0.0135) (0.0419) (0.0136) (0.0691) (0.0220)
Observations 75,860 75,860 61,532 61,532 65,615 65,615 52,317 52,317 8,449 8,449 8,359 8,359
Clusters 316 316 229 229 311 311 226 226 46 46 44 44
Notes: Panel C reports results leaving out all observations from the New York City MSA, and has all other controls as in Table 3. Panel D
reports results leaving out the controls, but still including the linear MSA time-trend and fixed effects for each month-year, transit agency,
and transit agency-calendar month pairs. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the MSA level. See notes for Table 3
for additional details.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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Table A.3: Alternate methods of statistical inference for the effect of Uber on log public transit ridership
Total Bus Rail
Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration Uber entry Uber penetration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Block bootstrap
UberX 0.00263 -0.00190 0.0138∗∗ 0.00758 0.0189 0.0168 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.00243 -0.0312 -0.103∗ 0.00370 -0.0274
(0.0148) (0.0380) (0.00538) (0.00664) (0.0167) (0.0336) (0.00471) (0.00633) (0.0212) (0.0549) (0.0184) (0.0254)
Above median population 0.0665∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ 0.0383 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0365 0.0198
× UberX (0.0318) (0.00791) (0.0315) (0.00949) (0.0593) (0.0214)
Above median ridership -0.0811∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0465∗ -0.0131 0.0771∗ 0.0215
× UberX (0.0304) (0.0103) (0.0237) (0.00920) (0.0410) (0.0171)
Panel B: p-values from placebo test of randomly assigning treatment at MSA-month level
UberX 0.8750 0.9765 0.0070 0.2625 0.3055 0.7655 0.0010 0.7720 0.1430 0.0830 0.8245 0.3435
Above median population 0.0320 0.0005 0.2640 0.0260 0.5385 0.3700
× UberX
Above median ridership 0.0455 0.0320 0.1890 0.3285 0.0320 0.2100
× UberX
Panel C: p-values from placebo test of randomly assigning entry date
UberX 0.8650 0.9655 0.0070 0.2730 0.2705 0.7450 p < 0.0005 0.7950 0.1370 0.0730 0.8535 0.2830
Above median population 0.0260 p < 0.0005 0.2355 0.0010 0.5695 0.3720
× UberX
Above median ridership 0.0090 0.0010 0.0320 0.1345 0.0585 0.2135
× UberX
Notes: Panel A calculates standard errors using block bootstrapping at the MSA level (with two thousand draws), while Panels B and C
report p-values from a placebo test. In Panel B we randomly re-assign the observed treatment variables at the MSA-month level. In Panel C
we randomly assign which cities Uber enters and when. For the penetration data in Panel C, we assign treated cities a penetration history
from an MSA which was actually treated and adjust the timing to match the placebo treatment date. For untreated cities, we randomly
assign a penetration history from an MSA which was not treated. We then calculate p-values by comparing the t-statistic from our main
results to those generated by two thousand placebo treatments. All other controls as in Table 3.
*p<.1;**p<.05; ***p<.01
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